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COMMERCIAL TRUSTS AS
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
AN INVITATION TO COMPARATISTS
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally restricted to gratuitous transactions,1 trusts are in-
creasingly employed as business organizations in a wide range of
commercial and financial transactions in the United States.2 They are
commonly used, for example, in asset securitization transactions,3
have become a primary tool for investing pension moneys,4 and are
the preferred form for structuring mutual funds.5 There is, however,
relatively little scholarly or systematic understanding of these com-
mercial uses of trusts (“commercial trusts”).6
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1. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE
L.J. 625, 632 (1996).
2. John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Com-
merce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 172 (1997) (noting that perhaps trillions of dollars of mortgage, credit
card, automobile, and student loan debt is financed through trusts) (hereinafter Langbein, The
Secret Life of the Trust).
3. For an introduction to asset securitization, see STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED
FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (3d ed. 2002); Steven L.
Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994) (hereinafter
Schwarcz, Alchemy).
4. “American pension trusts have attained stupendous size and importance . . . [and, as of
year-end 1996,] own more than a quarter of American equities and about half of all corporate
debt.” Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust, supra note 2, at 168-69.
5. “As of May 1997, American mutual funds held nearly $4 trillion in assets [and] about
half or more of American mutual funds take the trust form.” Id. at 171 (footnotes omitted). See
also Jeffrey M. Laderman, Your Guide to Mutual Funds, BUS. WK., (Feb. 3, 1997), at 62: “In
1996, some $223 billion was handed over to equity-[mutual] fund managers . . . . It’s almost as
much as the gross domestic product of Sweden.”
6. Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the
Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559, 560 (2003) (hereinafter Schwarcz, Unraveling the Mystery).
11(B)SCHWARCZ_FMT 09/10/03  4:14 PM
322 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 13:321
Outside the United States, parties similarly engage in securitiza-
tion deals, invest in pension and mutual funds, and enter into other
commercial and financial transactions that, in the United States,
would use the trust form.7 The question thus arises: would commercial
trusts also be useful in those non-U.S. transactions? The answer is
complicated not only by the poor general understanding of commer-
cial (as opposed to gratuitous) trusts but also by the fact that, in many
non-U.S. jurisdictions other than the United Kingdom and other
Commonwealth nations, trust law itself is relatively nascent.8
It is nonetheless important to at least begin to answer this ques-
tion. The trust form is increasingly being scrutinized, and trusts or
variations on the trust form are beginning to be embraced worldwide.
Certain civil law and mixed-law jurisdictions, for example, already
have adopted the trust form.9 Other civil law jurisdictions are starting
to “adopt trust-like institutions,”10 and “important efforts are under-
way to promote recognition by nontrust jurisdictions of trusts formed
in other countries.”11 One civil law scholar even claims that “the trust
7. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Universal Language of International Securitization, 12
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 285 (2002) (discussing international securitization).
8. Michael Milo & Jan Smits, Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems, in TRUSTS IN MIXED LEGAL
SYSTEMS 13 (J. M. Milo et al. eds., 2001) (observing that the type of divided-ownership charac-
teristic of common law trusts does not exist in civil law countries).  Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS, Introductory Note to Chapter 1, at 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996) (noting that the
trust is “peculiarly a product of the Anglo-American system”); Maurizio Lupoi, The Civil Law
Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 967, 969 (1999) (observing that “there is a ‘common core’ at
the basis of the Anglo-American trust”).
9. Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434,
444 (1998) (citing mixed-law jurisdictions including Louisiana, Quebec, and Scotland, as well as
civil-law jurisdictions including Japan, Lichtenstein, Israel, and several South American coun-
tries, that have adopted the trust).
10. Hansmann & Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law, supra note 9, at 435-36 (citation
omitted). These trust-like institutions include special guardianship institutions to manage assets
on behalf of minors or incompetents, id. at 442 (using examples from Italian law), as well as con-
tractually-based civil-law relationships that have some of the attributes of a trust, id. at 442-43.
The latter relationships can be illustrated by the “romanistic fiduciary transaction,” or fiducia, in
which a party transfers ownership of specific assets to a manager, who then contractually man-
ages these assets, as the transferor’s agent, for the benefit of a third-party beneficiary designated
by the transferor. Id. at 443. The parties to these relationships, however, are not as fully pro-
tected as the parties to a common law trust. See id. at 443-44 (explaining that a buyer of these
assets from the manager is “protected, even when he knows that the [m]anager is acting in bad
faith”). Although the law of some civil-law countries has “evolved” to permit recovery of those
assets, id. at 443, “the scope of this protection is generally not as broad as that afforded by the
trust.” Id. (comparing Italian and Swiss law, which allow limited recovery of the assets, with
German law, which allows even less recovery). Hence, these trust-like relationships “do not
provide completely adequate substitutes for the common law of trusts.” Id. at 444.
11. Hansmann & Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law, supra note 9, at 435-36 (citation
omitted) (referring to the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their
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belongs to the civil law, whence it was imported in England during
the formative period of the Chancellor’s jurisdiction over trusts.”12 In
this scholar’s view, the belief that trusts are inconsistent with civil
law13 reflects the failure of common and civil law scholars to seriously
address the basis of trust law:
The mere fact that trusts exist in civil law countries should prove
the point that there is no basic incompatibility with civil law struc-
tures. Why, then, is the opposite view held so unanimously? The
simple answer is that common law scholars have not attempted a
comparative study of the civil law institutions, while civil law schol-
ars have not attempted a comparative study of trusts.14
Some civil law countries also have been moving legislatively to clarify
that trusts are consistent with their law. It has been reported, for ex-
ample, that “every European country has enacted legislation”
shielding trust property from claims against mutual-fund and invest-
ment-firm intermediaries that operate as portfolio managers.15 Japan
and Korea have adopted similar laws.16
Recognition, concluded July 1, 1985 (Hague Conference on Private International Law, available
at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/text30e.html), providing conflicts of law rules by which
non-trust countries can recognize foreign trusts). As of June 6, 2000, that Convention has been
ratified by Australia, Canada, China (only with respect to its Hong Kong Special Autonomous
Region), Cyprus, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the
United States. See http://www.hcch.net/e/status/stat30e.html (visited Nov. 5, 2002).
12. Lupoi, The Civil Law Trust, supra note 8, at 968-69 (arguing for the existence of civil
law trusts).
13. Cf. PHILIP R. WOOD, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 36 (1995) (arguing
that traditional civil law objections to the trust may be based on a concern that trusts are unfair
to creditors of the legal owner, who believe they can claim against all assets that the legal owner
appears to own).
14. Lupoi, The Civil Law Trust, supra note 8, at 976.
15. Hansmann & Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law, supra note 9, at 458-459 (citing ex-
amples from French, Italian, and German law, and also referencing applicable European Union
directives). See also D.J. HAYTON, S.C.J.J. KORTMANN & H.L.E. VERHAGEN, PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN TRUST LAW (1999) (examining ways of incorporating the common law trust into
European law). But cf. e-mail from Dr. Joanna Benjamin, Reader in Law, London School of
Economics and member of the Bank of England’s Financial Markets Law Committee, to the
author (Oct. 9, 2002) (observing that a “major challenge in achieving a single financial market in
Europe is the lack of a domestic law of trusts in the civil jurisdictions making up all of Europe
other than England and Ireland”).
16. For Japan, see Shintaku Ho [Trust Law], Law No. 62 of 1922, art. 16, no. 1, translated in
Eibun-Horei-Sha, EHS Law Bulletin Series Japan Vol. 6, CD1 (1994); See also KAZUO
SHINOMIYA, SHINTAKU HO 183 (Yuhikaku 1989); MITSUBISHI SHINTAKU GINKO SHINTAKU
GENKYUKAI, SHINTAKU NO HOMU TO JITSUMU 51 (Kinyuzaiseijijyo Genkyukai, 3d ed. 1999).
For Korea, see Sintakbop, Act No. 900 (1961), art. 22, translated in KOREA LEGISLATION
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA Vol. 3, 361 (1997).
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Traditionally, however, comparative literature on trust law ap-
pears to have focused almost exclusively on gratuitous trusts.17 This is
not surprising; the gratuitous trust is the historical prototype, and
even the use of trusts for commercial purposes in the United States is
fairly recent.18 Nevertheless, given their increasing dominance, the
existence of commercial trusts should be taken into account for a
fuller, and thus more accurate, picture.
This essay is a preliminary step in examining whether commer-
cial trusts might be useful in non-U.S. transactions.19 It proceeds by
redacting to fundamental principles, shorn of any uniquely U.S.-
specific considerations,—and thereby making accessible to foreign
lawyers as well as comparative-law scholars—the analytical frame-
work for commercial trusts that I constructed in a separate article.20
That framework differentiates commercial from gratuitous trusts, and
also addresses such basic questions as whether commercial trusts are
a better form of business organization than corporations and whether
existing trust law is adequate to govern commercial trusts.21 The
framework shows that commercial trusts and corporations can be
thought of, in the United States, as mirror-image entities that respond
to different investor needs; and that the essential distinction between
these entities turns on the degree to which assets need to be placed at
risk in order to satisfy the expectations of residual claimants.22
17. The only comparative literature on trust law I have found that addresses commercial
trusts, albeit briefly, are Hansmann & Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law, supra note 9, at 466-
69 & 472-78; David Hayton, Hugh Pigott & Joanna Benjamin, The Use of Trusts in International
Financial Transactions, 17 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 23 (2002).
18. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust, supra note 2, at 188.
19. That this essay is able to be even a preliminary step is thanks to the strong foundation
of scholarship set by Professor John Langbein on trust law generally and by Professors Henry
Hansmann and Ugo Mattei on comparative-trust law. Their works are cited throughout the es-
say, and I am doubly fortunate to have received their invaluable comments on the recent article,
Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 6, from which this essay derives. None of these scholars,
however, has answered such fundamental questions as what makes commercial trusts different
from corporations. See, e.g., Hansmann & Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law, supra note 9, at
479: “We are left . . . with the question whether the differences between these two forms [corpo-
rations and trusts] are in any way fundamental . . . .” Although Prof. Langbein argues that trusts
are more attractive because they facilitate pass-through taxation (The Secret Life of the Trust,
supra note 2, at 189), that explanation does not fully explain the continued vitality of the com-
mercial trust after tax law changes, made subsequent to his article, which allow most non-
publicly traded corporate entities in the United States to avoid entity-level taxes. See infra note
39 and accompanying text.
20. See Schwarcz, Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 6.
21. Id.
22. I refer to residual and senior claims and claimants in the economic sense. Senior claim-
ants have the right to repayment of their claims prior to repayment of residual claims. Residual
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This essay does not, however, purport to provide a truly com-
parative analysis of commercial trusts. Such an analysis would need to
be as much functional as legal. One might begin, for example, by
identifying all the types of transactions in which commercial trusts are
used in the United States, and then compare the characteristics of
those commercial trusts with the characteristics of their counterpart
business organizations in analogous transactions in other legal sys-
tems. That analysis is beyond the essay’s scope.
II. ANALYSIS
A trust is “a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, aris-
ing as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create that rela-
tionship and subjecting the person who holds title to the property [the
trustee] to duties to deal with it for the benefit of” third-party benefi-
ciaries.23 This relationship therefore, as for a corporation, separates
ownership (by the residual beneficiaries) from management (by the
trustee) and imposes fiduciary duties on management to act for the
benefit of the beneficiaries.24 Also, as for a corporation, the trust rela-
tionship provides for limited liability: beneficiaries of the trust may
claim (absent breach of trust) only against the trust assets, not against
personal assets of the trustee;25 nor may the trustee’s personal credi-
tors claim against the trust assets.26
claimants, however, have the right, traditionally associated with ownership, to all remaining
value once the senior claims have been paid in full. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a
Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 667 (1996).
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996) (although the
Restatement itself does not specifically address commercial trusts; see id. § 1, comment b, and §
5, comment l).
24. Although one explanation of the trust relationship is that the beneficiaries hold equita-
ble title whereas the trustee holds mere legal title (historically, the distinction between legal and
equitable interests being traceable to the separation of judicial functions in English courts of
common law and chancery, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1996), Introductory Note at 3, this distinction “has not been one of universal acceptance.” Id.,
Reporter’s Notes on § 2 (stating, for example, that “although the provisions of the Japanese
Trust Law as a whole closely parallel trust law principles set out in the Restatement, Second, of
Trusts, trust concepts in that country are based on and discussed in terms of obligation rather
than legal and equitable property rights”). See also Shintaku Ho [Trust Law], Law No. 62 of
1922, art. 1.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 204 (1959) (non-liability of trustee for loss in
absence of breach of trust).
26. Id., § 266 (person to whom trustee has become liable cannot reach trust property). Ac-
cord, Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition, supra note 23, art.
2(a) (providing that a trust’s “assets constitute a separate fund and are not a part of the trustee’s
own estate”).
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Commercial trusts bear even greater resemblances to corpora-
tions.27 Unlike a gratuitous trust, in which the party transferring assets
to the trust (the “settlor”) receives no compensation for the convey-
ance,28 the settlor in a commercial trust—typically a corporation or fi-
nancial institution—always receives payment for the assets conveyed
to the trust.29 The settlor in a commercial trust also will retain a resid-
ual interest, entitling the settlor to retain any trust assets remaining
once the business transaction is concluded.30 (In contrast, a settlor in a
gratuitous trust may or may not retain a residual interest.) Commer-
cial trusts are therefore bargained-for exchanges where resort to the
trust form serves a commercial advantage.
This can be illustrated by a typical example from structured fi-
nance. A company settles a trust by transferring financial assets to the
trust in return for payment in the form of trust certificates and a bar-
gained-for residual interest in the trust.31 The company then raises
funds by selling the trust certificates to capital-market investors,32 who
buy the certificates expecting that the trust assets will generate suffi-
cient cash to repay their investment plus the contractual rate of return
specified in the certificates.33 The residual interest entitles the com-
pany to any assets remaining in the trust once the certificates are paid
in full.34
27. Accord, Hansmann & Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law, supra note 9, at 472 (noting
that commercial trusts “bear[] an obvious resemblance to the corporation”). Trusts, in fact, were
commonly used as a form of business enterprise in the 19th century. Langbein, The Secret Life
of the Trust, supra note 2, at 188-89.
28. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, supra note 1, at 632.
29. Schwarcz, Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 6, at 562.
30. Id.
31. A trust certificate is simply a writing that evidences the holder’s undivided interest, to
the extent specified in the writing, in the trust assets. See Thomas S. Harman, Emerging Alter-
natives to Mutual Funds: Unit Investment Trusts and Other Fixed Portfolio Investment Vehicles,
1987 DUKE L.J. 1045, 1053.
32. Capital-market investors are investors in “markets where capital funds—debt and eq-
uity—are traded. Included [in these markets] are private placement sources of debt and equity
as well as organized markets and exchanges.” JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN GOODMAN,
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 59 (3d ed. 1991) (definition of capital mar-
kets).
33. Although in some trusts the senior trust certificates or debt instruments are issued di-
rectly to investors (with the proceeds and a residual trust certificate being paid to the settlor to
purchase the financial assets), that difference would not affect this essay’s analysis.
34. This residual amount can be significant. To ensure repayment, capital market investors
usually demand that the amount of assets conveyed to the trust be well in excess of the mini-
mum necessary to repay such investors. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 3, at 141. The residual
claim to these assets after the investors are repaid therefore is a valuable property right which
the settlor is unwilling to give up. Id.
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Thus, the deal is an arm’s-length, negotiated bargain in which all
parties benefit and the company does not give up more value than
needed to make the deal work. The investors, as senior claimants of
the trust, get their money back with interest.35 The company, as resid-
ual claimant, receives payment for the financial assets sold to the trust
and is entitled to any residual value of those assets once the investors
are paid in full.36 In economic terms, the deal is strikingly similar to a
secured loan in which surplus collateral is returned to the debtor once
lenders receive principal and interest.
To construct a more complete framework for analysis, I exam-
ined representative types of commercial trusts at length,37 which re-
vealed that, at least descriptively, commercial trusts tend to be static
entities that diversify risk and often avoid an entity-level tax.38 These
features, however, are insufficient by themselves to create an analyti-
cal framework because they are not necessarily unique to commercial
trusts; nothing prevents corporations, for example, from restricting
their charters to become static entities, and corporations can certainly
diversify risk by issuing different classes of shares. Moreover, most
non-publicly traded entities with the functional attributes of corpora-
tions can, at least in the United States, now avoid entity-level taxes.39
I therefore added to the framework by examining commercial
trusts from the three fundamental perspectives by which one can
think about a business entity: for what purposes does the entity exist
(its “legal existence”); how is the entity governed (its “governance”);
and what effect does the entity have on its surroundings and vice
versa (its “exogenous effects”).
III. LEGAL EXISTENCE
Not all commercial trusts are recognized as having separate legal
existence,40 and indeed some are recognized under certain laws but
35. Schwarcz, Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 6, at 563.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 563-73 (examining trusts used as special purpose vehicles, or SPVs, in struc-
tured finance transactions, trusts used to diversify lending risk, master trusts used to enable an
originator of financial assets generally to sell interests therein to the broadest investor base,
trusts used in mutual funds for pooling investor money in order to invest in securities, and deeds
of trust used as the functional equivalent of a security device for the granting of collateral).
38. Id. at 573. For a discussion of entity-level taxes in cross-border transactions, see
Schwarcz, The Universal Language of International Securitization, supra note 7, at 303-05.
39. Schwarcz, Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 6, at 565.
40. Cf. e-mail from Dr. Joanna Benjamin, supra note 15, at 1 (stating that, to her knowl-
edge “under English law, trusts are never treated as legal persons”).
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not others.41 In contrast, corporations almost always are recognized as
having separate existence at law.42 Business planners therefore may
favor trusts where non-entity status is needed to avoid a tax. How-
ever, a trust’s lack of legal existence could be troublesome if its bene-
ficiaries are concerned that the company transferring assets to the
trust might go bankrupt.43 If bankruptcy law did not recognize the
trust, the assets thought to be conveyed to the trust would still belong
to the bankrupt company. Therefore, where bankruptcy is a realistic
risk, a commercial trust either is sought to be created under specific
laws that recognize its existence, or else corporations are used.44
IV. GOVERNANCE
From the standpoint of this second perspective, commercial
trusts are seen to be static entities with passive managers (the trustees
of the trust).45 This contrasts sharply with business corporations,
whose managers tend to be aggressive and opportunistic to take ad-
vantage of business opportunities. I believe this reflects the most fun-
damental distinction between trusts and corporations.
To understand this distinction, note that in a corporation the re-
sidual claims, which are evidenced by shares of stock, are sold to
third-party investors (“shareholders”). The shareholders expect a rate
of return that compensates them for the money they voluntarily put
at risk. If that rate of return is not forthcoming, they will not invest
and the system of shareholder corporate finance would collapse. It
therefore is essential that corporations engage in business ventures
that are likely to increase their profitability. In contrast, a corpora-
tion’s senior claimants (its creditors) will be paid principal and inter-
est (the latter being their contractual rate of return) so long as the
corporation is solvent. However, allowing a solvent corporation to
engage in business ventures to increase its profitability brings no
benefit to creditors, whereas failure of the venture might bring a risk
of insolvency and hence loss.
The fundamental goals of a corporation’s shareholders (residual
claimants) and creditors (senior claimants) therefore compete. Cor-
porate law resolves these competing goals by allowing managers—the
41. Schwarcz, Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 6, at 574.
42. See id.
43. In many non-U.S. jurisdictions, bankruptcy law is referred to as insolvency law. My
analysis above would apply to companies subject to these laws, whatever they are called.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 575.
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corporation’s board of directors—to take risks in order to maximize
corporate profitability (and thus shareholder return) so long as the
corporation is not insolvent.46 For this reason, the board of directors is
responsible, absent insolvency, to shareholders but not creditors.47
Trust law, on the other hand, developed historically from gratui-
tous trusts. The degree of conflict between senior and residual claim-
ants that was seen with corporations is unlikely to arise in a gratuitous
trust because the expectations of its claimants, in practice, tend to be
consistent: to preserve the value of the trust assets.48 For example, a
trust with no residual claimants avoids conflict by having only senior
claims. A trust where the settlor is the only residual claimant—as in
settlor transferring a life-estate in assets for the benefit of third party,
residual to settlor—rarely creates a significant conflict because the
settlor, unlike a corporate shareholder, normally would not expect a
risk-weighted return on its claim.49 Even a trust where the residual
claimants are third parties—as in husband transferring a life-estate in
assets for the benefit of his wife, residual to his children—does not
46. Id. at 576.
47. Id. Although “[n]ormally, we speak of directors owing a duty to the corporation[,] . . .
courts typically expand the statement of the directors’ duty to say that directors owe their duty
to the corporation and its shareholders. . . . Normally, however, courts have refused to recognize
that directors have fiduciary obligations to the corporation’s creditors (or to other constituent
groups beyond the shareholders).” FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 4.1.5, at
304-06 (2000) (citations omitted).
48. See, e.g., IIA AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS,
§176, at 482 (4th ed. 1987): “It is the duty of the trustee to use care and skill to preserve the trust
property.” Accord, id., § 174, at 468 (“In making investments the trustee is under a duty not only
to exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his
own property, but he must use the caution of one who has primarily in view the preservation of
the estate entrusted to him, a caution that may be greater than that of a prudent man who is
dealing with his own property.”); id. § 181, at 544-45 (even where a trustee is “authorized to
make . . . land productive by managing it, he is not under a duty to lease it”); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS (Prudent Investor Rule) § 227, at 20 (“Normally, in investing the funds of a
trust, the trustee’s strategy must make preservation of the trust estate (including its purchasing
power) a significant consideration”); GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 106, at 387 (6th ed. 1987)
(“[A trustee] has no duty to make investments for the purpose of increasing the [real] value of
the trust assets. He is not permitted to speculate with the trust principal”); David Hayton, Eng-
lish Fiduciary Standards and Trust Law, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 555, 556 (1997) (discuss-
ing the trustee’s duty under English law to avoid investments that are “attended by hazard”)
(quoting Lord Watson).
49. I am not claiming there is no conflict. The distinction turns on the degree of conflict. Cf.
e-mail from John H. Langbein, Sterling Professor of Law & Legal History, to the author (Aug.
10, 2002) (observing that there is “an imbedded conflict of interest in every trust that has multi-
ple interests, especially the common successive (life and remainder) estates”); Edward C. Hal-
bach, Jr., Significant Trends in the Trust Law of the United States, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L.
531, 550 (1999) (discussing techniques for “avoiding conflicts between productivity require-
ments and optimal total-return investment objectives through creative trust design”).
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create the degree of conflict that occurs between a corporation’s
creditors and shareholders: the children, receiving a gift for which
they gave nothing in return, could not reasonably expect the trustee
to jeopardize the wife’s life-estate solely in order to maximize the
children’s residual return. Although the children will want the trustee
to ensure that the trust assets preserve their value,50 that goal does not
allow the trustee to “endanger the safety of principal to produce a
large income.”51 Instead, trust law imposes a duty of impartiality:
where “there are two or more beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee is
under a duty to deal impartially with them.”52
As a practical matter, commercial trusts likewise avoid conflicts
between senior and residual claimants. Although the settlor’s interest,
as residual claimant, is theoretically the inverse of the beneficiary’s
interest, as senior claimant (because each dollar used to pay the sen-
ior claimant reduces by a dollar the amount available to return to the
residual claimant), this conflict is rarely problematic. The settlor-
residual claimant, unlike a corporate shareholder, does not ordinarily
expect a risk-weighted return on its claim. Instead, its business goal is
simply to retain any surplus value in the trust’s assets.53 So long as
50. And, indeed, trust law imposes on the trustee a “duty to . . . the remainder beneficiaries
[i.e., the residual claimant] to exercise reasonable care in an effort to preserve the trust prop-
erty, and this duty ordinarily includes a goal of protecting the property’s purchasing power.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (Prudent Investor Rule) § 232.
51. Id. at 181-82. Accord, SCOTT & FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 48, § 227,
at 18 (observing that while trust law today recognizes that “[a]ll investments . . . and all invest-
ment strategies involve some risk in the comprehensive sense of possible loss of real, inflation-
adjusted value, the duty of caution still calls for the prudent management of risk”). The duty of
caution is reflected in “[c]ase law and prior Restatements [of the Law of Trusts which] have
condemned ‘speculation’ and excessive risk . . . .” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (Prudent
Investor Rule) at 6. Although a proposed Uniform Prudent Investor Act would, where enacted,
substitute a requirement of sensitivity to risk in place of the directive to avoid speculation, that
change is not expected to materially change “the outer reaches of the risk/return distribution.”
John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA
L. REV. 641, 650 (1996).
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), OF TRUSTS § 183, at 149 (Duty to Deal Impartially with Bene-
ficiaries). To understand how the duty of impartiality works, assume that the foregoing trust has
$500,000 of assets—a life-estate with which the wife is satisfied—and the opportunity to invest
in a business transaction with a 90% chance of successfully doubling the assets but a 10%
chance of losing all the assets. A trustee considering this investment would have to weigh the
10% chance that the wife will lose her entire life-estate against the 90% chance that the chil-
dren’s residual estate will be significantly increased. Even though the investment has a signifi-
cantly positive expected value, it may well constitute excessive risk. If so, the trustee’s duty of
impartiality would prevent it from making the investment. Accord, Hayton, English Fiduciary
Standards and Trust Law, supra note 48, at 556-64 (discussing the trustee’s duty under English
law).
53. Schwarcz, Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 6, at 578.
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there are no third-party residual investors, commercial trusts do not
have the economic constraints that corporations have to be profit-
able.54
The degree to which assets need to be placed at risk in order to
satisfy the expectations of residual claimants therefore provides a key
to distinguishing commercial trusts from corporations. Although the
interests of a trust’s senior and residual claimants are theoretically in-
consistent, the expectations of all such claimants would be satisfied
merely by preserving the value of the trust assets. Because preserving
this value is usually a ministerial job, trustees can operate under a
duty of impartiality.55
The expectations of senior and residual claimants of a corpora-
tion, however, are significantly more divergent: shareholders demand
increased profitability, not merely preservation of corporate value,
whereas creditors are concerned that risks taken to achieve profit-
ability might lead to corporate insolvency.56 This divergence would
make a corporate duty of impartiality difficult to apply.57 In place of
that duty, corporate law requires, absent insolvency, that the duty of
managers is to the residual claimants, i.e., the shareholders. This sug-
gests that the trust form is useful where residual claimants of a busi-
ness organization do not expect management to favor their class of
claims over senior claimants.58
54. If all the beneficiaries of a trust want it to be profitable, as in a mutual fund, there is not
even a theoretical conflict; the trustee’s obligation to achieve profitability then reflects the duty
“to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS, supra note 22, § 170(1) (duty of loyalty).
55. Schwarcz, Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 6, at 578.
56. The divergence of senior- and residual-claimant expectations also explains why corpo-
rate managers are generally better trained and more sophisticated than trustees.
57. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors, supra note 22,
at 672-77 (explaining the difficulties of trying to determine how directors of an insolvent corpo-
ration can balance their duties to shareholders and creditors). See also id. at 676 (likening such
balancing to “the dilemma of comparing apples and oranges”) and at 673 (observing that
“[c]urrent law . . . does not provide any hard and fast rules” on how to achieve the balance).
58. Accord, Hansmann & Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law, supra note 9, at 473 (arguing
that trust law helps to balance conflicting interests among a trust’s claimants by “[m]aking the
[trustee] a pure fiduciary, not subject to control by any of the” residual claimants). The forego-
ing analysis also helps to explain why the governance rules of corporation and trust law begin to
converge in insolvency. See Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors, su-
pra note 22, at 667-68 (discussing such convergence). The value of a residual claimant’s claim
against the business entity then approaches zero while the senior claimants face a risk of non-
payment; and indeed senior claimants will become de facto residual claimants to the extent of
insolvency. Senior claimants therefore should be owed a fiduciary duty by the entity’s managers.
And, indeed, directors of an insolvent corporation have been held to owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporation’s creditors (senior claimants) as well as shareholders (residual claimants). Id. at 665-
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V. EXOGENOUS EFFECTS
This final perspective, exogenous effects, views the effect an en-
tity has on its surroundings, and vice versa. In business, perhaps the
most common exogenous effect is the cost of taxes. Taxes are gener-
ally imposed on the income of each entity that is recognized under tax
law as having separate existence. Thus, absent an exemption from
taxes, corporations generally would be subject to “entity-level”
taxes.59
Trusts also can affect third parties, such as by diversifying their
risk. However, because corporations likewise can diversify risk, such
as by issuing different classes of shares,60 this exogenous factor is neu-
tral. Similarly, because investors in a trust (at least in the United
States) are not usually liable for the debts and other obligations of the
trust,61 an immunity that is generally the same as that of shareholders
of a corporation, that exogenous factor is also neutral.
VI. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
The foregoing examination suggests the following framework for
analysis:
Commercial trusts might not be recognized as having
separate legal existence. This can allow a trust to avoid en-
68 and 668 n.100. Some have even referred to this shifting of corporate fiduciary duty as the
“trust fund doctrine.” Laura Linn, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper
Scope of Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1511-12 n.87 (1993) (“[t]he courts
have reasoned that, upon insolvency, the directors become “trustees” for the creditors and hold
corporate assets as a “trust fund” for the benefit of these investors).
59. In the United States, however, as a result of recent tax law changes, non-publicly traded
entities with the functional attributes of corporations now can usually avoid entity-level taxes.
Schwartz, Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 6, at 565 n.40.
60. See sentence prior to text accompanying note 39 supra.
61. James M. Ginocchi & Kimberly A. Taylor, How “Limited” is Pennsylvania’s Limited
Liability Company Act?, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 613, 649 (1995).  See also IIIA AUSTIN W. SCOTT &
WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, §274.1, at 521 (4th ed. 1998) (observing that
“[b]y the weight of authoriy it is held that the beneficiaries are not personally liable … where
the beneficiaries [lack] power to control the conduct of the trustees to such an extent that the
trustees are their agents”).  But cf. id at 521-22 (nothing that “[i]n some states [of the United
States] the courts have held that the beneficiaries of a business trust are personally liable even
though by the terms of the trust they have no control over the conduct of the trustees.  The basis
for imposing liability is that the use of the trust as a substitute for the corporate device is against
public policy, as tending to evade the policy of the law against limited liability with incorpora-
tion.”); e-mail from Lionel Smith, William Dawson Scholar in Law, Faculty of Law, McGill
University, to the author (May 14, 2003) (observing that, from the Canadian and English law
perspective, a “crucial (and quite justified) difference between corporations and trust is that the
beneficiaries/investors of a business trust are indeed very likely to bear unlimited personal li-
ability for claims arising out of the conduct of the business, at least in the case of tort claims”).
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tity-level taxes, whereas corporations are more likely to be
subject to such taxes (though separate legal existence may be
important where bankruptcy remoteness is a goal). Trustees
need only preserve the value of the trust’s assets for claim-
ants, which requires minimal managerial discretion and cost.
In contrast, corporate managers must actively manage assets
to achieve a profitable return for residual claimants.
I next apply this framework to the use of commercial trusts and
corporations in securitization transactions, analyzing why and under
what circumstances the trust form would be used over the corporate
form.
VII. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK
Securitization transactions exemplify the seemingly interchange-
able use of trusts and corporations as forms of business organization.62
Viewing these transactions from the standpoint of the framework,
however, reveals that the trust and corporate forms are not always in-
terchangeable but tied to the transaction’s underlying business pur-
pose.
As mentioned, a primary business goal is to minimize or even
avoid entity-level taxes, and this is equally true for securitization
deals.63 For this reason, trusts were somewhat favored in the United
States as SPVs; they could be organized to avoid these taxes, whereas
(at least until recent tax law changes64) most corporate entities could
not.
Once organized, the SPV uses the funds raised from investors to
purchase financial assets from a company. The company, however,
almost always retains a residual interest in those assets.65 The reten-
62. In a typical securitization transaction, a company transfers rights to payment from in-
come-producing financial assets, such as accounts receivable, loans, or lease rentals, to an SPV,
which in turn transfers such rights to a second SPV, which in turn issues securities to capital
market investors. The second SPV uses the proceeds of the issuance to pay the first SPV for the
financial assets, and the first SPV then uses those proceeds to pay the company. The investors,
who are repaid from collections of the financial assets, buy the securities based on their assess-
ments of the value of the financial assets. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of
Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1999).
63. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET
SECURITIZATION, supra note 3, § 5:2.3, at 5-11.
64. See supra note 39.
65. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. See also Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 3;
Schwarcz, Law and Economics of Securitization, NEW BUS. L. (JAPAN) issues 580 (Nov. 1, 1995,
Part I at 35-38) and 581 (Nov. 15, 1995, Part II at 50-56).
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tion of this interest can complicate resolution of who actually owns
the financial assets if the company later goes bankrupt.66 In some
transactions, parties are prepared to live with this ambiguity. But
where bankruptcy remoteness—in the form of a “true sale” of the fi-
nancial assets from the company to the SPV—is critical to the transac-
tion’s success,67 parties often look to corporate law in order to avoid
ambiguity. Corporate law usually provides a more developed legal
framework than trust law because corporations have long been rec-
ognized under bankruptcy law as having separate legal existence. Se-
curitizations thus can achieve bankruptcy remoteness by being struc-
tured as “two-tier” transactions in which the first tier is a sale of
financial assets to a corporate-SPV.68
The governance criteria, however, often favor a trust over a cor-
porate form for securitization transactions where bankruptcy remote-
ness is unimportant. This is because the trustee of a trust-SPV cannot
(under the duty of impartiality) favor the residual claimant (settlor)
over the SPV’s creditors, whereas directors of a corporate SPV owe
their primary fiduciary duty to residual claimants (shareholders).
Creditors would be concerned, for example, that corporate directors
might put the SPV into bankruptcy to protect the shareholders’ eq-
uity interest therein, thereby harming creditor claims by “suspending
their right to payment and possibly compromising their claims.”69
Thus, in the U.S. where banks are exempt from the federal bank-
ruptcy laws,70 securitizations involving banks often take the trust
form.71
66. Schwartz, Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 6, at 581-82.
67. Compare Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 3, at 135 (noting that investors may not want
to take the risk of the company’s bankruptcy) with Schwarcz, The Universal Language of Inter-
national Securitization, supra note 7, at 291 (observing that a true sale may be unnecessary in
jurisdictions where a secured creditor “would be able to enforce its rights against the [collateral]
in the event of the local law equivalent of a bankruptcy case”).
68. “[E]ven in a structured financing in which a . . . trust is used to issue the asset-backed
securities, an intermediary corporate SPV is often used as the initial transferee of assets from
the originator (which SPV in turn transfers such assets to the trust) and is the bankruptcy re-
mote SPV for which legal opinions are delivered. This is in part because of the uncertain status
that a . . . trust might have under applicable commercial law principles.” The Committee on
Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 571 n.130 (1995). See also Schwarcz,
Alchemy, supra note 3, at 142 (discussion of two-tier structure).
69. Schwarcz, Rethinking A Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors, supra note 22, at 684.
70. 11 U.S.C. § 109.
71. Master trusts are sometimes also used, directly in transactions where bankruptcy re-
moteness is unimportant and indirectly (as the second SPV) in two-tier structures where bank-
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VIII. FINAL OBSERVATIONS
My examination of commercial trusts reveals a number of char-
acteristics that might make them attractive, irrespective of the par-
ticular legal system. To the extent trusts are not viewed as separate
legal entities for tax purposes, they might be used in lieu of corpora-
tions wherever an entity-level tax must be avoided and “bankruptcy
remoteness” is not critical. Otherwise, the main attraction of the trust
form turns on its governance characteristics.
Trusts normally operate under a duty of impartiality, which limits
the ability of the trustee, as manager of the trust, to take risks in order
to make the trust profitable for residual claimants at the possible ex-
pense of senior claimants. In contrast, boards of directors of corpora-
tions generally owe their primary fiduciary duty to the residual claim-
ants (shareholders), and thus may engage in positive expected-value
ventures even if there is a possibility of creditor loss. The trust form is
therefore well suited (and thus arguably more efficient) for business
entities whose residual claimants do not expect a high return, in con-
trast to the corporate form which is better suited for residual claim-
ants that expect a high return.
For these reasons, the efficiency of forming a business entity as a
trust or corporation may depend on the nature of the business’s as-
sets. If, as in an SPV used for securitization, the business has mostly
financial assets whose value can be predicted with some accuracy and
is unlikely to significantly increase, senior and residual claimants
would focus more on protecting their interests. The trust form would
facilitate this capital structure because the duty of impartiality would
effectively and cheaply protect all investor interests. If, on the other
hand, the business has mostly non-financial assets, the asset values
may be difficult to calculate precisely. Potential senior investors then
would demand a high overcollateralization in order to avoid loss,
leaving a potentially significant residual value.72 Investors who want a
high return and are willing to accept high risk may wish to invest in
the residual claims. The corporate-form would facilitate this capital
structure because the senior claimants have already protected them-
ruptcy remoteness is desirable, to diversify risk by issuing a variety of securities having different
returns and risk levels, thereby maximizing funding from investors.
72. Overcollateralization means that the amount of assets dedicated to paying an investor
is higher than the amount strictly necessary for such payment. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 3,
at 144.
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selves by contract, whereas the residual claimants would want the di-
rectors to try to maximize the residual value.73
These observations, I realize, derive from U.S. experience with
commercial trusts. They may not apply equally to foreign jurisdic-
tions, with fundamentally different legal, economic or cultural sys-
tems. Nonetheless, it is useful to set forth the U.S. experience in order
to illustrate the fundamental commercial realities underlying the use
of trusts as business organizations, which in turn might serve as a
starting point for foreign lawyers and comparatists interested in ap-
plying the commercial trust form to their own legal systems.
73. In this context, one might speculate what would happen if market forces caused com-
mercial trusts to offer to sell residual interests to third parties (as I have seen in a very limited
context where residual trust certificates in collateralized-debt-obligation deals are sold to third-
party investors). Residual claimants of the trust, just like shareholders in a corporation, then
may demand a rate of return that compensates them for the money they voluntarily put at risk,
thereby creating a conflict with the trust’s senior claimants. This, in turn, might stimulate
changes in trust law, perhaps reducing the extent to which trustees are subject to liability for
breach of trust by permitting them to assert a doctrine comparable to the business judgment
rule as a defense, or even creating a duty of trustees to third-party residual claimants similar to
the duty of corporate directors to shareholders. Cf. Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 611
F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), in which the court struggled as to whether trustees of a REIT
who were alleged to have breached their fiduciary duty should be judged by the corporate busi-
ness judgment rule or by stricter trust law standards. The decision was that “it is appropriate to
judge the conduct of REIT trustees by the standards generally applied to corporate fiduciaries.”
Id. at 1017. The court’s rationale was that “the trustees of a REIT are functionally more similar
to corporate directors than to ordinary trustees,” id. at 1016 (citing 16A FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §8249, at 619 (R. Eickoff rev. ed.
1979)).
